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PUTTING  THE  EQUITY  BACK  INTO
INTELLECTUAL  PROPERTY  REMEDIES
Henry E. Smith*
Within the realm of remedies, intellectual property remedies have presented particular diffi-
culties, and in intellectual property law, controversy has focused on remedies.  Concerns about
holdup in intellectual property have even begun to lead to innovations in the law of remedies
itself.  Many of the difficulties and controversies raging now center around remedies that are
“equitable.”  In this Essay I argue that recovering a major function of equity—as meta-law—
helps us understand these problems and to offer potential solutions.  Meta-law is a higher order
intervention when regular law fails, in contexts of high complexity and uncertainty, often stem-
ming from polycentricity, conflicting rights, or opportunism. These problems are rife in intellec-
tual property settings.  An attention to meta-law can focus on potential two-sided opportunism in
scenarios of possible injunctions, and a more traditional equitable framework can help frame
when presumptions for injunctions are appropriate and when they should be overcome.  Equity as
meta-law allows us to avoid flattening the law of intellectual property remedies.
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INTRODUCTION
Nowhere is the question of remedies more front and center than in
intellectual property.  In recent years intellectual property cases have even
exerted some influence on the law of remedies more generally.  At the same
time, equity and the traditions of equity are invoked in the very process of
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cutting back on injunctions and making them into a rare form of “supracom-
pensatory” remedies.  And nowhere is the mysterious role, if any, of equity
more needed and less apparent than in intellectual property remedies.  We
have an equity deficit.
It is not as if uses of the word “equity” are lacking.  Certain remedies are
labeled “equitable,” as are certain defenses.  The United States Supreme
Court points to the “tradition[s] of equity” as a source of law for intellectual
property remedies, among other things.1  And people seem to think that
equity means discretion.2  Beyond that there be monsters—to the extent any-
one is paying attention.
And yet equity shapes the law of intellectual property remedies in a
more thoroughgoing way.  I will claim that once we understand some of the
true functions of equity, it probably should play a much greater and more
explicit role in our law,3 and especially in intellectual property remedies.
One such function is meta-law.  A theme of equity with deep roots in the
Western tradition is its role in correcting the law when it failed because of its
generality.  Intellectual property and its associated remedies strive for sim-
plicity and generality but fail in characteristic ways.  These involve complexity
and uncertainty that stem from interactions among parties, their activities,
and the resources they employ to develop information.  Of particular rele-
vance is the possibility that informed parties, of which there is no lack in
situations involving intellectual property, will bend the system to purposes for
which it was not designed.  This problem of opportunism is hard to specify in
advance because such efforts invite further game playing.  Announcing the
line past which something will be treated as constructive fraud will allow the
well informed to engage in “compliant non-compliance.”4  Moreover, oppor-
tunism itself is multiparty, and multidimensional solutions to one party’s
opportunism often invite another’s.  Removing the leverage one party can
obtain through an injunction can lead the other party to abuse a system
based on (inevitably) imperfectly determined damages.
These problems are especially difficult to deal with head on, and I will
argue that they are especially suited for treatment on another level—that of
meta-law.5  Certain problems of great uncertainty and complexity call for an
ex post intervention that ranges over the law and employs more context than
the law usually does, in a process of adjustment.  These problems include
multipolar relations, conflicting rights, and opportunism.  Each of these
1 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390–91 (2006); Samuel L. Bray,
The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND. L. REV. 997, 1000–02 (2015).
2 See, e.g., Andrew Kull, Ponzi, Property, and Luck, 100 IOWA L. REV. 291, 292–93, 300
(2014).
3 See Henry E. Smith, Equity as Meta-Law, 130 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2021) [hereinaf-
ter Smith, Equity as Meta-Law (manuscript at 2) (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3734662); Henry E. Smith, Equity as Second-Order Law: The Problem
of Opportunism (Harvard L. Sch. Pub. L. Working Paper, Paper No. 15-13, 2015).
4 John Braithwaite, Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty, 27 AUSTRALIAN J.
LEGAL PHIL. 47, 55–56 (2002).
5 See Smith, Equity as Meta-Law, supra note 3 (manuscript at 3).
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involves complex interaction, whether among multiple parties, among multi-
ple presumptive rights, or among an unspecified set of other elements of the
legal system.  Even opportunism results from hard-to-foresee exploitation of
the weaknesses thrown up by the law.
Existing approaches to intellectual property remedies suffer from under-
exploiting the potential of equitable meta-law.  Frameworks for thinking
about remedies, especially property rules versus liability rules,6 treat reme-
dies along a spectrum of strength rather than as multidimensional and finely
adjusted, as in traditional equity.  The caselaw has partially followed this flat-
tening of remedies.  From the standard for injunctions to the underutiliza-
tion of doctrines like estoppel, the law tries to do at one messy level what
could be handled more effectively using equity as a second-order modulation
of the law.
This Essay will excavate the remnants of equitable meta-law in the area
of intellectual property remedies.  It will show how current approaches are
lacking and how a reconstruction of equitable meta-law could solve some of
these perennial problems without introducing new ones.  Part I will show
how the law of intellectual property remedies has been flattened in many
respects.  In Part II, I show how popular frameworks for thinking about reme-
dies if anything go even further in this direction, leaving many loose threads.
Part III then shows how bringing out the theme of meta-law among the equi-
table aspects of intellectual property law could help the law of intellectual
property remedies more effectively address some common complaints about
its current state.  The Essay concludes with some thoughts about how to over-
come the current impasse in intellectual property remedies.
I. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REMEDIES FLATTENED
Commentators and many courts have flattened the law of remedies.
Indeed, they have flattened the law in general and in remedies in particular.
The consequences for intellectual property are especially serious.
What is flattened law?  Implicit in much commentary about the law is the
“heap” conception.  Law is a heap of rules, each of which can be evaluated in
isolation, because each contributes additively to the fitness of law (its effi-
ciency, fairness, promotion of autonomy).  This assumption traces back to
legal realism and beyond and can be seen in proto form in Holmes’s aphoris-
tic admonition that “a body of law is more rational and more civilized when
every rule it contains is referred articulately and definitely to an end which it
subserves, and when the grounds for desiring that end are stated or are ready
to be stated in words.”7  The legal realists assumed something along these
lines in holding up legal doctrine to the light of policy and especially in
assuming that property is not just a bundle of rights but metaphorically a
6 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienabil-
ity: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972).
7 O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
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“bundle of sticks.”8  Sticks hardly interact with each other, and a bundle of
noninteracting sticks can be optimized stick by stick.  If we optimize one
stick, we are improving the bundle and getting toward overall optimization.
Making a stick better is overall improving because there is no room for a
negative effect produced in tandem with other sticks.  As an outgrowth of
legal realism, much of law and economics adopts this atomizing reductive
view of law as a heap when it analyzes “legal rules” for their efficiency.
In keeping with the realist legacy, alternatives to the heap picture face
some suspicion.  The realists were expert at tarring alternatives as formalist
and deductive, and claiming that such approaches could not handle the com-
plexity of modern law and society (and that only realism could).9  While it is
true that some approaches to “system” in the writings of the nineteenth cen-
tury were rather formalist, a closer look reveals a variety of notions of sys-
tem.10  In particular, it is decidedly not the case that all such notions were of
logical or deductive systems.  Thus, pace Holmes’s aphorism “[t]he life of the
law has not been logic: it has been experience,”11 we are not necessarily in
the realm of logic but of experience when we regard law as a system.
What kind of system is the law?  That I leave for another day, but a
glance at the modern notion of system from complex systems theory is illumi-
nating.12  In complex systems theory, a system is a collection of intercon-
nected elements, and a complex system is one in which the elements are so
interconnected that they give rise to emergent properties.13  These proper-
ties hold of the system as a whole and cannot be traced to the individual
contributions of elements taken individually.  The connections between ele-
ments need not be deductive or logical.  Thus, for instance, in the bundle of
rights, the reason to cluster attributes together is that they are complemen-
8 See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY
69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980); Walton H. Hamilton & Irene Till,
Property, in 11 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 528, 528 (Edwin R.A. Seligman &
Alvin Johnson eds., 1937); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to
Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 357–58 (2001).
9 See, e.g., THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 114–16 (1937); JAMES
E. HERGET, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, 1870–1970: A HISTORY 146–48 (1990); G. EDWARD
WHITE, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, in
PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 136, 136–39 (1978). See generally RICHARD A. POS-
NER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING (2013) (arguing from complexity against formalism and for
a new judicial realism).
10 See Mathias Reimann, Nineteenth Century German Legal Science, 31 B.C. L. REV. 837
(1990).
11 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.,  THE COMMON LAW 1 (Dover Publications 1991)
(1881); see also Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 3 (1983) (call-
ing this statement “the central slogan of legal modernism”).
12 See Henry E. Smith, Systems Theory: Emergent Private Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF THE NEW PRIVATE LAW 139, 140, 154 (Andrew S. Gold, John C.P. Goldberg, Daniel B.
Kelly, Emily Sherwin & Henry E. Smith eds., 2021).
13 MELANIE MITCHELL, COMPLEXITY: A GUIDED TOUR 13 (2009); HERBERT A. SIMON, THE
SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL 195 (2d ed. 1981); Ludwig von Bertalanffy, An Outline of General
System Theory, 1 BRIT. J. FOR PHIL. SCIENCE 134, 141 (1950).
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tary; they are more valuable taken together.  One reason would be that using
one attribute affects the use value of another attribute.  Given the patterns of
use, we might find that attributes cluster into modules (there is a community
structure that can be found using familiar algorithms) and these might corre-
spond to legal things.14  (We might want to adjust the interface between such
things and other things by suppressing unimportant connections and crystal-
lizing others.)  Likewise, notions of possession, definitions of legal thing, and
tort causes of action can interact to produce an effect not reducible to single
“rules.”15  Thus, with aerial trespass, instead of looking for rules for aircraft,
rules for drones, rules for overhanging eaves, etc., we see an interplay
between a partially specified notion of legal thinghood (surface boundaries
extended upward and downward indefinitely, but not infinitely, under ad
coelum) along with definitions of possession (for buildings and activities) and
rights to possess (for building upward and a lesser form of protection), safe-
guarded by trespass and supplemented by nuisance.16  The owner’s protec-
tion is emergent out of this complex interplay of devices.
Complexity comes in degrees.  Despite the popular emphasis on chaos
and the too-easy assumptions of simplicity, many systems fall somewhere in
between the extremes of chaos and simplicity.  If every attribute of every
resource were maximally connected to every other, any change in one could
set off massive ripple effects in terms of the value of the whole (unified)
resource, which can result in genuine chaos.  At the other pole (of simplicity)
where attributes are not connected at all, the fitness landscape is correspond-
ingly simple, with one maximum.  However, interconnection may be less
than maximal, and the interconnections may not be evenly distributed, a
phenomenon known as “organized complexity.”17  And correspondingly, a
fitness landscape for organized complexity is jagged but shows local peaks
and valleys.18  In organized complexity, spontaneous evolution may be
enough for local maximization.  Reaching some maxima may require larger
14 Ted Sichelman & Henry E. Smith, Modeling Legal Modularity 2 (2017) (unpub-
lished manuscript) (https://extranet.sioe.org/uploads/sioe2017/sichelman_smith.pdf);
see also Ted M. Sichelman, Quantifying Legal Entropy, in THE PHYSICS OF THE LAW: LEGAL
SYSTEMS THROUGH THE PRISM OF COMPLEXITY SCIENCE (forthcoming).  On network algo-
rithms, see, for example, M.E.J. Newman & M. Girvan, Finding and Evaluating Community
Structure in Networks, 69 PHYSICAL REV. E 026113-1 (2004).
15 Henry E. Smith, Property as a Complex System 16–19 (Oct. 1, 2020) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author); see also Spencer Williams, Contracts as Systems, DEL. J.
CORP. L. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 12, 16) (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3687773).
16 RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF PROP.: INTEFERENCES WITH, AND LIMITS ON, OWNERSHIP &
POSSESSION § 1.2A (Am. L. Inst., Council Draft No. 2, Nov. 27, 2019) (describing trespass
by overflight); RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF PROP.: THE BASICS OF PROP. § 1.1 (AM. L. INST.,
Council Draft No. 1, Sept. 13, 2019) (defining possession); id. § 1.8 (describing rights to
possession).
17 Warren Weaver, Science and Complexity, 36 AM. SCIENTIST 536, 539 (1948).
18 Lee Alston & Bernardo Mueller, Towards a More Evolutionary Theory of Property Rights,
100 IOWA L. REV. 2255, 2266–67 (2015); Smith, supra note 12, at 143–44.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-4\NDL412.txt unknown Seq: 6  9-APR-21 18:08
1608 notre dame law review [vol. 96:4
changes.19  In any case, when it comes to entitlements, they are neither atom-
istic nor additive.  Instead, attributes are likely to cluster into components or
modules in which interaction is more intensive within the module than at the
interface between the modules.  To leave this out of the picture is to flatten
the law in this respect.
This flattening is quite apparent in the law of remedies.  Damages
involve assigning a monetary value to liability.  Damages may reflect some
combination of compensation, deterrence, and other, e.g., expressive, pur-
poses.20  To the extent that damages are awarded by juries without special
verdicts, they are the output of a black box.  The determination of damages
may be complex, but the complexity is not directly visible to the legal system.
Equitable remedies are a more mixed picture.  The most salient equita-
ble remedy is the injunction, an order issued by a court to perform or refrain
from some action(s).  Violation of an injunction can lead to being found in
contempt and jailed or fined.  Injunctions are not as of right but are within
the discretion of the court.  Traditionally, there was a complex and interac-
tive set of rules of thumb for considering an injunction.21  This set of rules of
thumb had certain features in common across areas of law but would take on
different shades depending on the question at hand.  Thus, the inquiry for
an injunction in a trespass case would differ from that in a nuisance case, and
both would differ from the considerations involved in intellectual property
injunctions.
The traditional rules of thumb had to do with inadequacy of the legal
remedy.  Inadequacy of the legal remedy is a complex congeries of considera-
tions of difficulty of valuation, inconveniences of repeated litigation, poten-
tial undermining of the right, and so on.22  The trigger for equity here would
be the inadequacy of the legal remedy (which could stem from a variety of
factors).  Although this has been regarded as a vacuous “rule” because one
can find examples of almost any kind of situation leading to an injunction,23
there is more to say in favor of this trigger for equity.24  As I have argued
elsewhere, inadequacy of the legal remedy (or alternatively irreparable
19 Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus Common Law
Property, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 52 (2012); Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, Conver-
gence and Divergence in Systems of Property Law: Theoretical and Empirical Analyses, 92 S. CAL. L.
REV. 785, 790 (2019).
20 See, e.g., Felipe Jiménez, Rethinking Contract Remedies (U.S.C. Ctr. for L. & Soc. Sci.,
Paper No. CLASS20-19, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3721546.
21 Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E. Smith, The Supreme Court’s Accidental
Revolution?  The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 233 (2012).
22 See, e.g., Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 530,
544–50 (2016).
23 See, e.g., DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 5 (1991);
Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687, 688–701
(1990).
24 See Gene R. Shreve, The Premature Burial of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 70 TEX. L. REV.
1063, 1064–65 (1992) (reviewing LAYCOCK, supra note 23); Smith, Equity as Meta-Law, supra
note 3 (manuscript at 55).
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injury) is best regarded as a trigger for a complex equitable analysis.  It shows
that we have entered meta-law, where a different, more interactive and open-
ended style of analysis is exceptionally called for.25  Also relevant to an
injunction would be disproportionate hardship—does the injunction visit far
more harm on the enjoined party than the small benefit it affords the
movant?  A range of third-party effects are also relevant, sometimes traveling
under the heading of public policy.  And key to the availability of an injunc-
tion or a defense would be the good faith and absence of unclean hands on
the part of anyone seeking to benefit from any equitable remedy or defense.
This approach to injunctions is, I will argue, well suited for intellectual
property if its meta-law aspect is well understood.  Nevertheless, there are
initial challenges in applying injunctions in intellectual property, especially if
meta-law is not foregrounded.  For one thing, injunctions afford the movant
a great deal of leverage, not keyed to how much might be “deserved” in any
given case.  For this, traditional equity employed the undue hardship
defense, but this defense itself has been much misunderstood in recent
times, being treated as an exception in favor of liability rules and a balancing
in the sense of equipoise (would the injunction do more harm than good).26
A major challenge to the use of traditional considerations in evaluating
injunctions is how to implement the requirement of good faith.  What consti-
tutes good faith varies by context and presents some challenges specific to
intellectual property.  For boundary encroachments in real property, good
faith means with knowledge of the rights violation.  Disproportionate hard-
ship can be invoked for minor encroachments made in good faith mistake.27
Good faith plays a much lesser role in nuisance because the point is recon-
ciling conflicting rights, but even there maliciousness can be a factor in
pointing toward an injunction.28
In intellectual property, we might expect injunctions for knowing viola-
tions, but often the contention is that a violator did not know of a patent or
25 See Smith, Equity as Meta-Law, supra note 3 (manuscript at 3).
26 See Douglas Laycock, The Neglected Defense of Undue Hardship (and the Doctrinal Train
Wreck in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement), J. TORT L., no. 3, art. 3, Dec. 2011, at 1, 1.
27 See Renaissance Dev. Corp. v. Universal Props. Grp., Inc., 821 A.2d 233, 238 (R.I.
2003) (noting that “in situations . . . ‘where the [defendant’s] encroachment was inten-
tional . . . the courts . . . have issued the mandatory injunction without regard to the
relative convenience or hardship involved’” (quoting Ariola v. Nigro, 156 N.E.2d 536, 540
(Ill. 1959)); Culbertson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2001 UT 108, ¶ 56, 44 P.3d 642, 658
(“[W]here the encroachment is deliberate and constitutes a willful and intentional taking
of another’s land, equity may require its restoration, without regard for the relative incon-
veniences or hardships which may result . . . .” (quoting Papanikolas Bros. Enters. v. Sugar-
house Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 535 P.2d 1256, 1259 (Utah 1975)); Whitlock v. Hilander
Foods, Inc., 720 N.E.2d 302, 307 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (“One who knows of a claim to land
that he proposes to use as his own proceeds at his peril if he goes forward in the face of
protest or warnings from the owner and places a structure on the land.”).
28 See, e.g., Sundowner, Inc. v. King, 509 P.2d 785, 787 (Idaho 1973) (enjoining as a
spite fence a large sign erected solely to annoy neighbor); Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in
American Land Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 62–63 (1987) (setting forth different
approaches to “spite fences”).
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reasonably thought the plaintiff’s patent was invalid or did not cover the
accused activity.29  To the extent that notice is difficult or ineffective, the
standard for good faith in injunctions must be correspondingly more accom-
modating and the disproportionate hardship defense easier to invoke than in
building encroachments.
In recent times, the complexity of this picture of injunctions has been
partially obscured, and partly in response to problems originating in intellec-
tual property cases.  Most notably, as part of its ostensible interest in equity,
the U.S. Supreme Court in a patent case restated the test for injunctions.
Despite invoking the “traditional principles of equity” and calling the test
“well-established,”30 the Court’s four-part test was cribbed from the standard
for preliminary injunctions, doubling up on irreparable harm.  (Although
the test was largely unheard of by remedies scholars,31 there were a few scat-
tered antecedents in state and lower federal caselaw.32)  To obtain an injunc-
tion a movant must show:
(1) [T]hat it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available
at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that
injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff
29 See, e.g., Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice Externalities, 5
J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 2–3 (2013).
30 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391, 394 (2006).
31 Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s Equitable Discretion Following eBay v.
MercExchange, 27 REV. LITIGATION 63, 76 n.71 (2007) (“Remedies specialists had never
heard of [eBay’s] four-point test.”); see also DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REME-
DIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 426 (4th ed. 2010) (stating “there was no ‘traditional’ four-part
test” for permanent injunctions).
32 The following standard has been used in Kansas for both preliminary and perma-
nent injunctions:
(1) [T]here is a reasonable probability of irreparable future injury to the movant;
(2) an action at law will not provide an adequate remedy; (3) the threatened
injury to the movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may
cause the opposing party; and (4) the injunction, if issued, would not be adverse
to the public interest.
Sampel v. Balbernie, 889 P.2d 804, 807 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) (about injunctive relief).
Sampel was cited in Empire Manufacturing Co. v. Empire Candle, Inc., 41 P.3d 798, 808 (Kan.
2002), a case on preliminary injunctions (but did not acknowledge the difference).  More
recently, the Kansas Court of Appeals used the test in a permanent injunction case.  Kiekel
v. Four Colonies Homes Ass’n, 162 P.3d 57, 63 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007).  Nevertheless, the
Kansas Court of Appeals has shown itself open to presumptions of irreparable injury.  Per-
simmon Hill First Homes Ass’n v. Lonsdale, 75 P.3d 278, 283 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003).  Pick-
ing up on an earlier (mistaken) statement by the U.S. Supreme Court that the standards
for temporary injunctions and permanent injunctions were “essentially the same,” Amoco
Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987) (“The standard for a prelim-
inary injunction is essentially the same as for a permanent injunction with the exception
that the plaintiff must show a likelihood of success on the merits rather than actual suc-
cess.”), some lower federal courts employed a four-factor test with a trivial “success on the
merits” prong rather than doubling up on irreparable harm as in eBay. See Gergen et al.,
supra note 21, at 208–10.
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and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.33
The decision was 9–0, accompanied by concurrences pointing in opposite
directions in terms of the availability of injunctions.34  As Mark Gergen, John
Golden, and I have argued, this test is problematic for quite a number of
reasons.35  It is not the traditional test,36 and for a reason.  Perhaps in order
to avoid presumptions in favor of injunctions, the test borrows from prelimi-
nary injunctions, where there is no reason to presume in the movant’s favor.
However, after a rights violation, the situation is different.  Likewise “balance
of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant” sounds like equipoise,
which is more appropriate for preliminary injunctions.  For permanent
injunctions, it is not: the idea is to identify situations in which injunctions are
usually called for and then use disproportionate or undue hardship—a gross
imbalance of the hardship—as a safety-valve-style defense.37  The test also
says nothing of the court’s ability to delay an injunction and condition it in
various ways, as well as to craft it to protect the right by going beyond the
terms of the right.  Finally and most glaringly, the test says nothing about
good faith.  This is especially damaging as the test has been used outside of
intellectual property.38  In addition to the predicted effect of lowering the
likelihood of obtaining an injunction in patent cases, especially by nonprac-
ticing entities, it is not clear that the test captures what really goes on in
injunction cases or is sanding away the useful details of that body of law.39
33 eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
34 Id. at 388, 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (indicating courts should be wary of aban-
doning traditional practice of “grant[ing] injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement
in the vast majority of patent cases”); id. at 397 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The potential
vagueness and suspect validity of some of these [business-method] patents may affect the
calculus under the four-factor test.”).
35 See Gergen et al., supra note 21, at 205–06.
36 See LAYCOCK, supra note 31, at 426 (stating “there was no ‘traditional’ four-part test”
for permanent injunctions); Rendleman, supra note 31, at 76 n.71 (“Remedies specialists
had never heard of [eBay’s] four-point test.”).
37 Herbert F. Schwartz, Injunctive Relief in Patent Infringement Suits, 112 U. PA. L. REV.
1025, 1045–46 (1964) (suggesting a “[g]rossly [d]isparate [h]ardship” standard).  The
recent trademark leglisation provides for a rebuttable presumption for those seeking an
injunction after a finding of a rights violation or a showing of likelihood of success on the
merits.  Trademark Modernization Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-260, § 226, 134 Stat. 1182
(2020) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a)) (“A plaintiff seeking any such injunction shall be
entitled to a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm upon a finding of a violation
identified in this subsection in the case of a motion for a permanent injunction or upon a
finding of likelihood of success on the merits for a violation identified in this subsection in
the case of a motion for a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.”).
38 See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 144, 156–58 (2010) (apply-
ing the eBay four-factor test in a NEPA case, using no presumptions).
39 Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An
Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 2002 (2016); see also Elizabeth A. Rowe, eBay, Perma-
nent Injunctions, and Trade Secrets, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 553, 557 (2020) (finding that
eBay test is not literally applied in trade secret cases).
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Those details are associated with discretion, but the move away from
traditional equitable standards is fraught with irony.  In our system, the
replacement for equity has not been more rules but even more discretion,
whether as some diffuse generalized equity, vague standards, or multifactor
balancing tests that afford decisionmakers great leeway.40  It is true that we
could come up with some rules, such as nonpracticing entities never get
injunctions.  However, their likely overinclusiveness invites discretion on the
micro level, so that even patterns of fewer injunctions do not show that
judges are not empowered with discretion under tests like that in eBay.41
The law of intellectual property is not unique in having been flattened.
While developments in intellectual property remedies have been driven in
part over concerns about hold-up, a lack of appreciation for the meta-law
character of much of traditional equity, extending back at least to the realist
era if not beyond, has allowed the law of intellectual property remedies to
partake of the flattening of private law.
II. FLATTENED FRAMEWORKS FOR REMEDIES
The law of intellectual property remedies is in a state of flux, especially
with respect to the issuance of injunctions.  When it comes to the commen-
tary and frameworks for thinking about remedies, this flattening of the law is
even more pronounced.
Flattening of the law is also characteristic of the framework of property
rules and liability rules, initiated by Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed,
especially as interpreted in the vast subsequent literature.42  A property rule
is a remedy that is robust with a view to forcing the would-be taker of an
entitlement to obtain the consent of its current holder.  A liability rule allows
a taker to violate or acquire the entitlement on condition of paying officially
determined damages.  These damages can be set at market compensation or
some other amount (for example at 150% in an attempt to reflect subjective
value).
It has often been remarked that injunctions are not well captured by
property rules.43  For all the reasons stated above, the conditionality and dis-
40 See Smith, Equity as Meta-Law, supra note 3 (manuscript at 73–75).  The targeted and
guided nature of this version of equity goes some way toward mitigating the perverse
effects of expensive law tailored on small litigants. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Two-Tiered
Trademarks, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 295, 296–97 (2018) (arguing that tailored law even if more
accurate in one case systematically disadvantages small litigants and distorts the law).
41 See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public
Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2012) (documenting decline in injunction rates);
Christopher J. Clugston & Wonjoon Kim, The Unintended Consequences of the Injunction Law
After eBay v. MercExchange: An Empirical Study of the Effects on Injunctions in Patent Law, 99 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 249, 261–63 (2017) (showing decline in rate of injunctive
relief not just for nonpracticing entities but in certain industries).
42 See, e.g., IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS 5
(2005) (citing Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 6).
43 Bray, supra note 22, at 563, 570, 570 n.214; Smith, Equity as Meta-Law, supra note 3
(manuscript at 71–72).
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cretion involved in injunctions makes them more than a larger hammer com-
pared to compensatory damages (liability rules).  Injunctions are not just or
mainly a supracompensatory remedy.  In the next Part, I will show how
injunctions diverge from damages along another dimension not unrelated to
conditionality and discretion: equitable meta-law.
Interestingly, the literature on liability rules makes some room for other
dimensions of law in remedies, but mostly not in the places the law actually
does—and not in the most effective ways either.  Realizing that market dam-
ages or even average-harm damages can be improved upon, the academic
literature is replete with complicated liability rules mimicking complex
options, dual-chooser mechanisms, and even auctions.44  The idea is that
some framework beyond one decisionmaker picking a monetary amount
along one dimension can improve the system of damages.  There is a theoret-
ical case to be made for some of these schemes, in the sense that hypothetical
auctions tend to look good outside of any institutional context.45  In real life,
auctions are expensive and often vulnerable to manipulation.
Moreover, the complex liability rule literature would be hard to imple-
ment, and the gap between it and the law is likely to remain large.  The law
does not exhibit the preference for liability rules one would expect on these
theories, and liability rules are likely to be too complicated and under-protec-
tive in a wide variety of situations.46  Complex liability rules would require a
lot of knowledge on the part of actors, if not judges and juries.  More seri-
ously, complex liability rules would have to be quite complex to avoid
problems of manipulation.  For example, an average-expected-harm rule
would be vulnerable to savvy takers who could target assets that are likely to
be undervalued by a court.47
Perhaps most seriously, the liability rule literature, while promoting
complexity in remedies and even entitlements, does not come to grips with
44 AYRES, supra note 42, at 54–72; Ronen Avraham, Modular Liability Rules, 24 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 269, 270 (2004); Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions:
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703, 711 (1996).
45 Something similar can be said of self-assessment and the Harberger tax proposed
for property in ERIC A. POSNER & E. GLEN WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS: UPROOTING CAPITALISM
AND DEMOCRACY FOR A JUST SOCIETY 30–79 (2018); Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Property Is
Only Another Name for Monopoly, 9 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 54 (2017). See David K. Levine, Radical
Markets by Eric Posner and E. Glen Weyl: A Review Essay, 58 J. ECON. LITERATURE 471, 476
(2020) (book review); Juan Ramón Rallo, Property Is Only Another Name for Decentralized Crea-
tion of Knowledge, 47 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 43, 54 (2019); Smith, supra note 15, at 13; Leah
Marie Theriault, Things Without Stability of Possession: Hohfeld & the Harberger Tax
(2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Katrina M. Wyman, In Defense of the
Fee Simple, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 26–33 (2017).
46 Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules,
106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2093–96 (1997); Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 YALE
L.J. 2175, 2194–97 (1997); Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1719, 1722–23 (2004).
47 Smith, supra note 46, at 1764–68, 1774–85.
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the true complexity problems in property.48  If we think about resources as
made up of valued attributes, there is a question of which go with which.
Theoretically, we could imagine a world where entitlements corresponded to
atomic attributes, the smallest aspect of a resource that has value.  The prob-
lem is that some attributes are highly intertwined spatially and in terms of
value with other attributes.  Think water and soil or the right to farm and the
right to air and light.  What we treat as things is in part determined by what
constitutes a convenient and somewhat separable unit of such valued attrib-
utes.  However we define legal things, they can be somewhat malleable: if we
tax some attributes we can expect reconfigurations.49  A simple example is a
per unit tax on lightbulbs leading to substitution toward longer lasting light
bulbs.50  Another example is how parcels tend to be configured into thin
strips along rivers in order to maximize (misuse) riparian rights that attach to
any riparian parcel regardless of the length of its border with the water-
course.51  Valued attributes do not contribute in additive fashion to clusters
of such attributes.52  Instead, through everyday notions of things and
through legal definitions of real property parcels and intangible rights, we
find legal things corresponding to clusters of attributes that have some inter-
nal synergy and far less (even if still significant) connection to the rest of the
world.
In a flattened world, liability rules look better than they otherwise would.
Liability rules are, however, not the default remedy in property, and holdout
problems may be outweighed by other concerns like undercompensation.53
The need for injunctions goes beyond the benefits of the robustness of prop-
erty rules: injunctions allow the system of remedies to respond in a strategic
fashion to the strategic behavior of primary actors.
III. EQUITY AS A SOLUTION
In this Part, I propose a way out of these dilemmas of intellectual prop-
erty remedies.  Current frameworks and to some extent the law itself have
mostly flattened the law of remedies, although not completely.  Fragments of
an older approach to equity are still present and can be reformulated into a
48 Henry E. Smith, Complexity and the Cathedral: Making Law and Economics More Calabre-
sian, 48 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 43, 48–53 (2019).
49 See Yoram Barzel, An Alternative Approach to the Analysis of Taxation, 84 J. POL. ECON.
1177, 1178 (1976); see also Henry E. Smith, Ambiguous Quality Changes from Taxes and Legal
Rules, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 647, 683–96, 706 (2000).
50 See Barzel, supra note 49, at 1186.
51 Dean Lueck, The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law, 38 J.L. & ECON. 393,
407 n.46 (1995) (citing JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY (3d ed. 1993)).
52 Smith, supra note 15, at 9.
53 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 46, at 2094; Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118
HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1403–04 (2005); Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts,
121 HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1474–75 (2008); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Unbundling Homeownership:
Regional Reforms from the Inside Out, 119 YALE L.J. 1904, 1917–18 (2010) (reviewing LEE
ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND PROPERTY LINES (2009)).
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potentially better solution to the problems of remedies in intellectual prop-
erty.  Those fragments go under the heading of “equity,” and the missing
aspect of the discussion on remedies is equity in one of its most important
functions—as meta-law.
Although equity is often associated with remedies, a narrow focus on the
remedial aspect of equity can obscure its role in promoting the correct valua-
tion of assets.  As meta-law, equity aims at keeping processes—other
processes—from going too far astray.  Equity itself works synergistically with
these other processes to promote correct valuation as an emergent property.
The most familiar equitable remedy, the injunction, is governed by proxies,
presumptions, and rules of thumb that help it serve as meta-law—to alter the
framework in which other processes, legal and economic, unfold.  That syn-
ergistic effect is achieved by equity acting in tandem with the law of substan-
tive rights.  Equity ranges over the law and will modify the application of
rights themselves.
A. Equity as the Meta-Law of Valuation
Although equity was originally a product of courts with separate jurisdic-
tion and the scope of that jurisdiction arose in part by happenstance, there
are discernable themes to equity—themes that are relevant even today.  In
other work I have argued that equity acts as law about law, or meta-law.54
This view of equity can be traced back to Aristotle, for whom equity is “a
rectification of law where law is defective because of its generality.”55  Law
seeks to be general and relatively simple, but at the cost of some inaccuracy
in terms of efficiency and justice.  Equity steps in to modify the result the law
provides.  Equity refers to the law, acts on the legal result, and sometimes
molds the law, but not vice versa: the law can operate (sometimes badly)
without equity’s intervention.56
Overlooking the separateness of equity and misunderstanding its special-
ized function make it look worse than it is.  Equity is often criticized for being
too vague and ex post (the Chancellor’s foot),57 but as meta-law it has built-
54 See generally Smith, Equity as Meta-Law, supra note 3.
55 ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, at 317 (G.P. Goold ed., H. Rackham
trans., Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1934); see also ARISTOTLE, ART OF RHETORIC bk. I, at
140–45 (John Henry Freese transl., Gisela Striker rev., Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 2020)
(discussing equity).
56 F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY: A COURSE OF LECTURES 19 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker
eds., 2d ed. 1936) (stating that, if equity had been abolished, “in some respects our law
would have been barbarous, unjust, absurd,” but abolishing the common law “would have
meant anarchy,” because “[a]t every point equity presupposed the existence of common
law. . . . Equity without common law would have been a castle in the air, an impossibility.”).
57 Selden’s quip has become shorthand for this critique of equity:
Equity is a Roguish thing: for Law we have a measure, know what to trust to;
Equity is according to the Conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is
larger or narrower, so is Equity.  ’Tis all one as if they should make the Standard
for the measure we call a Foot, a Chancellor’s Foot; what an uncertain Measure
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in constraints.  Equity is not always applicable but is triggered only by certain
proxies for problems of great complexity and uncertainty.  Equity is not gen-
eral, but comes into play only when certain proxies for complexity and uncer-
tainty are present.  These proxies relate to deception, bad faith, and skewed
results (disproportionate hardship), and they vary by area of law (building
encroachments versus nuisance, for example).  What equity does not do is try
to define such problems as opportunism ex ante or even ex post in any
articulated fashion.  Instead it looks for indicia of the problem at the first
level (law) and kicks the problem up to equity (meta level), at which the
situation is subjected to a more searching analysis in terms of a more open-
ended set of contextual factors that are couched in terms of morality and
fairness.  Equity often sets the presumption against the one appearing to take
advantage of another’s vulnerability.  Criticisms of equity that look to these
moral formulations and presumptions and read them as “rules” or “direc-
tives” at the primary level of law miss the mark.
Consistent with the lessons of complex systems theory, going to a meta-
system is costly but especially suited for certain kinds of problems.58  These
involve uncertainty and complexity and are inherently difficult to deal with
ex ante and on the same level that they occur.  Among such problems are
multipolar (or polycentric) situations, conflicting rights, and opportunism.
Polycentric scenarios involve multiple interacting elements and are almost by
definition complex.59  Lon Fuller gives the example of dividing a collection
of paintings under a will between two museums, given that the value of a
painting to a museum depends on which others it has.60  In situations of
conflicting rights, each party has a presumptive right, but the two sets of
rights come into conflict and need to be reconciled.  On one interpretation,
would be this.  One Chancellor has a long Foot, another a short Foot, a Third an
indifferent Foot: ’Tis the same thing in the Chancellor’s Conscience.
JOHN SELDEN, Equity, in TABLE-TALK: BEING THE DISCOURSES OF JOHN SELDEN, ESQ. 43,
43–44 (J.M. Dent & Co., 3d ed. 1906) (1689).
58 See LUDWIG VON BERTALANFFY, GENERAL SYSTEM THEORY: FOUNDATIONS, DEVELOP-
MENT, APPLICATIONS 27–29, 74, 213–14 (1968) (discussing hierarchy in systems); JOHN H.
HOLLAND, HIDDEN ORDER: HOW ADAPTATION BUILDS COMPLEXITY 11–12 (1995) (discussing
aggregation and meta-agents); A.Y. Aulin-Ahmavaara, The Law of Requisite Hierarchy, 8
KYBERNETES 259, 261–62 (1979) (discussing required property of higher-order control
mechanisms); Francis Heylighen & Cliff Joslyn, Cybernetics and Second-Order Cybernetics, in 4
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHYSICAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 155 (R.A. Meyers ed., 3d ed. 2001)
(discussing motivations for moving to higher orders in cybernetics and the notion of sys-
tems of systems).
59 See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 395
(1978).
60 Fuller, supra note 59, at 394; see also MICHAEL POLANYI, THE LOGIC OF LIBERTY:
REFLECTIONS AND REJOINDERS 171 (1951).  This kind of problem increases exponentially as
the size of the problem increases. See KEITH DEVLIN, THE MILLENNIUM PROBLEMS: THE
SEVEN GREATEST UNSOLVED MATHEMATICAL PUZZLES OF OUR TIME 105–30 (2002); RAYMOND
GREENLAW & H. JAMES HOOVER, FUNDAMENTALS OF THE THEORY OF COMPUTATION: PRINCI-
PLES AND PRACTICE 287–313 (1998).
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this is what the law of nuisance accomplishes.61  Finally, opportunism is a
pervasive problem familiar to traditional equity.  Despite the broad defini-
tions of opportunism that attempt to include all residual bad behavior—per-
haps most famously the notion of opportunism in the work of Oliver
Williamson62—traditional equity took a more structured and thus con-
strained approach.  Its triggers (variants on good faith, including violation of
custom, and disproportionate hardship) were classed under “constructive
fraud,” which is activity that is not technically fraud or not provably so, but
contains a high danger of behavior that amounts to fraud and would be
treated as fraud if it were more directly definable.63  It is the compliant non-
compliance well known in the regulatory and tax literatures.64  Elsewhere I
have formulated opportunism for purposes of equity as “undesirable behav-
ior that cannot be cost-effectively defined, detected, and deterred by explicit
ex ante rulemaking.  Opportunism is residual behavior that would be con-
tracted away if ex ante transaction costs were lower.”65
By functioning as meta-law, equity and law can together do better than
law or equity could on its own.66  Law can be simpler, more formal, and more
general than it could if it had to deal directly with all of the misuse and
opportunism as well as multipolar and conflicting rights situations.  By the
same token, equity can be more targeted and contextually sensitive than it
could be if it had to apply across the board; if it were more general it could
not retain these features.  Analyzing the hybrid of law and equity (first- and
second-order) at the margins of each “rule” gives a distorted picture.  If law
and equity work in tandem, the marginal effect is a marginal system effect.
And if specialization of function is beneficial, then combining law and equity
61 John C.P. Goldberg & Henry E. Smith, Wrongful Fusion: Equity and Tort, in EQUITY
AND LAW: FUSION AND FISSION 309, 315 (John C.P. Goldberg, Henry E. Smith & P.G. Turner
eds., 2019); Henry E. Smith, Fusing the Equitable Function in Private Law, in PRIVATE LAW IN
THE 21ST CENTURY 173, 190–91 (Kit Barker, Karen Fairweather & Ross Grantham eds.,
2017); Smith, Equity as Meta-Law, supra note 3 (manuscript at 19–20).
62 OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MAR-
KETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 47 (1985); see also Oliver E. Williamson, Opportunism and
Its Critics, 14 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 97, 97–98 (1993) (defending the usefulness of
the notion of opportunism against social-science critics).
63 JOSEPH STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 258, at 261 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1836); Smith, Equity as
Meta-Law, supra note 3 (manuscript at 21–25); see also Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability:
A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293, 301–05 (1975); Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionabil-
ity and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 539 (1967).
64 On regulatory compliance, see Braithwaite, supra note 4, at 55–56.  On tax, see
David A. Weisbach, An Economic Analysis of Anti-Tax-Avoidance Doctrines, 4 AM. L. & ECON.
REV. 88, 93–95 (2002); David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860,
860–63 (1999).
65 Smith, Equity as Meta-Law, supra note 3 (manuscript at 24).
66 Id. (manuscript at 41–52).
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pushes out the production frontier for legal institutions in a way that is totally
uncaptured on a conventionally reductive rule-by-rule analysis.67
B. Injunctions and Meta-Law
The law of intellectual property remedies raises acute problems of com-
plexity and uncertainty of a kind that equity responds to.  Equity typically
looks at both sides (or all sides) of an interaction, with a view to their interde-
pendence.68  In intellectual property remedies, this is especially necessary.
Attempts to limit the leverage of patent holders’ holdup can open the door
to more holdout on the part of potential violators and those who could bene-
fit from a license.  Conversely, preventing violations adds to the patentee’s
leverage, which can be misused to extort a reward out of proportion to the
contribution of the patent.  This is especially serious where the violation is
not in bad faith, in the sense that it is an understandable mistake—it would
not be close to cost-effective to avoid it through more diligent search.69
The law of injunctions fits into a larger complex system, as part of meta-
law.  It guides both the law of damages and the transacting process, but only
indirectly.  By “indirectly” I mean that the results of equitable intervention
are emergent, not that equity does not “operate” directly on the rest of the
law.  Indeed, the contrast between the directness of its operation and the
indirectness of the effects it achieves is one of the sources of misunderstand-
ing about equity’s role.  Again, equity and law specialize, so that damages and
injunctions, and rights and remedies, can work in tandem.  It is not a tradeoff
on a single spectrum but a dynamic process of increasing the production
frontier.
One such misunderstanding is to regard injunctions as merely a stronger
version of damages.  An injunction is not an “off switch” for infringement,
but as John Golden argues, a “gateway” to contempt, and, as such, injunc-
tions respond to many conflicting possible responses including importantly
67 Models of specialization that stress economies of specialization (endogenous spe-
cialization) rather than economies of scale are most apt here. See, e.g., Xiaokai Yang,
Endogenous vs. Exogenous Comparative Advantage and Economies of Specialization vs. Economies of
Scale, 60 J. ECONOMICS 29, 29–32 (1994); Xiaokai Yang & Siang Ng, Specialization and Divi-
sion of Labour: A Survey, in INCREASING RETURNS AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 3, 4–6 (Kenneth J.
Arrow, Yew-Kwang Ng & Xiaokai Yang eds., 1998); see also Allyn A. Young, Increasing Returns
and Economic Progress, 38 ECON. J. 527, 538–39 (1928).
68 See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, Holding Up and Holding Out, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 1, 6, 34 (2014); Joseph Scott Miller, Standard Setting, Patents, and Access Lock-
In: RAND Licensing and the Theory of the Firm, 40 IND. L. REV. 351 (2007); Henry E. Smith,
Property as Platform: Coordinating Standards for Technological Innovation, 9 J. COMPETITION L. &
ECON. 1057 (2013).
69 This problem becomes worse to the extent that duty holders are not effectively pro-
vided with notice of intellectual property rights. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER,
PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 150–52
(2008); Herbert Hovenkamp, Response, Notice and Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. SEE
ALSO 221, 224 (2011).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-4\NDL412.txt unknown Seq: 17  9-APR-21 18:08
2021] putting  the  equity  back  into  ip  remedies 1619
the possibility of designing around.70  In this, patent injunctions are like
other injunctions, for as Doug Rendleman says, an adjudged infringer “may
dissemble, may claim that the injunction is vague and impossible or difficult
to understand, may seek delay, may search for loopholes, and may change as
little as possible to ‘obey.’”71  Golden points out that the formulation of an
injunction and claim scope have similar effects on incentives.  They achieve
these effects differently, though.  As Golden notes, injunction doctrine some-
times serves as a “safety valve[ ]” like equity.72  More generally, the way that
the law of injunctions addresses incentives, as identified by Golden, can be
seen as acting through its modulating effect on law as meta-law.73
Of particular interest is the important role played by “colorable differ-
ences” injunctions, in which a court will enjoin not only infringing products
but also those that are no more than colorably different.74  The notion of
“colorable” has roots in equity as a response to potential opportunism.75
Here the opportunism is of someone expert who can exploit the inadequa-
cies of ex ante delineation.  Tracy Thomas notes that prophylactic injunc-
tions are especially warranted when rights are difficult to specify ex ante
(leaving the underlying right untouched),76 and under some circumstances
one can, as Rafal Zakrzewski argues, see equitable remedies as modifying the
rights structure itself.77
Much of the discussion in patent remedies centers on holdup and to a
lesser extent on holdout.78  There is a pervasive sense in which equity
addresses the problem of holdup and holdout in intellectual property.  The
problem with the one-dimensional approach to remedies is that any solution
to holdup is likely to make holdout worse and vice versa.  A dose of meta-law
70 John M. Golden, Injunctions As More (or Less) Than “Off Switches”: Patent-Infringement
Injunctions’ Scope, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1409–10, 1413 (2012).
71 DOUG RENDLEMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: INJUNCTIONS, STRUCTURAL REMEDIES, AND
CONTEMPT 425 (2010).
72 Golden, supra note 70, at 1465.
73 See id. at 1461–62, 1465.
74 See TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., 646 F.3d 869, 881–83 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
The author did consulting work for TiVo in this case.
75 Even Edward Coke, no friend of equity, saw “discretion [as] a science or under-
standing to discern between falsity and truth, between wrong and right, between shadows
and substance, between equity and colourable glosses and pretences, and not to do accord-
ing to their wills and private affections.”  Rooke’s Case (1598) 77 Eng. Rep. 209, 210 (CP).
76 Tracy A. Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy: Normative Principles and Definitional Parame-
ters of Broad Injunctive Relief, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 301, 372 (2004); see also Golden, supra note 70,
at 1431.
77 RAFAL ZAKRZEWSKI, REMEDIES RECLASSIFIED 3 (reprt. 2009); see also YING KHAI LIEW,
RATIONALISING CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS 254–56 (2017).
78 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX.
L. REV. 1991, 2008–10 (2007); see also, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Erik Hovenkamp & Norman
Siebrasse, Demystifying Patent Holdup, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501, 1517–28 (2019); Carl
Shapiro & Mark A. Lemley, The Role of Antitrust in Preventing Patent Holdup, 168 U. PA. L.
REV. 2019, 2032–34, 2047–48 (2020). But see, e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, Has the Academy Led
Patent Law Astray?, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1313, 1344–46, 1351 (2017).
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has the potential to free us from this dilemma.  Thus, an injunction can be
conditioned on equitable behavior on the part of the patentee.  In the tradi-
tional framework, disproportionate hardship is a defense.79
The problems of polycentricity, conflicting rights, and opportunism are
endemic in intellectual property, especially when it comes to remedies.  The
question of how one patent contributes to an overall product, especially in
connection with a collection of other patents, is polycentric.  Apportioning
value for damages purposes has been a notorious problem in this area.80
Conflicting rights arise in situations of blocking, and the law—through
equity—modulates the respective rights of earlier and later inventors
through the doctrine of equivalents (and occasionally the reverse doctrine of
equivalents).  Finally, opportunism is the unforeseeable taking advantage of
law contrary to its purpose (related to abuse of right in civilian legal sys-
tems).81  The problems of misuse of patent leverage on the one hand and
bad faith refusals to license on reasonable terms on the other are examples
of parties using the full extent of the advantages the law affords them even in
situations in which the law is not aiming for such results.
C. Remedies and Meta-Law
The role of equitable meta-law in intellectual property is not solely a
matter of remedies.  Equitable remedies in intellectual property are inte-
grated with equity as meta-law more widely.82  Especially after the merger of
law and equity, the association of equity with remedies has led to an overly
narrow view of equity as primarily or solely remedial, a view that misses a
great deal.83  This narrow identification of equity with remedies is particu-
larly a problem in intellectual property, where equitable meta-law has been
misunderstood as a bad attempt at defining primary property rights.  Instead,
equitable remedies work with the rest of meta-law to achieve systems results,
including better valuation of intellectual assets.
79 See Laycock, supra note 26, at 1–2.
80 See, e.g., VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
Thomas F. Cotter, John M. Golden, Oskar Liivak, Brian J. Love, Norman V. Siebrasse,
Masabumi Suzuki & David O. Taylor, Reasonable Royalties, in PATENT REMEDIES AND COM-
PLEX PRODUCTS: TOWARD A GLOBAL CONSENSUS 6, 19–20 (C. Bradford Biddle, Jorge L. Con-
treras, Brian J. Love & Norman V. Siebrasse eds., 2019); John M. Golden, Judicial Policing of
Patent Damages Experts, 98 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1319 (2020).
81 On abuse of right, see, e.g., Anna di Robilant, Abuse of Rights: The Continental Drug
and the Common Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 687, 688–95 (2010); Larissa Katz, Spite and Extortion:
A Jurisdictional Principle of Abuse of Property Right, 122 YALE L.J. 1444, 1448–52 (2013); Joseph
M. Perillo, Abuse of Rights: A Pervasive Legal Concept, 27 PAC. L.J. 37, 38–47 (1995); A.N.
Yiannopoulos, Civil Liability for Abuse of Right: Something Old, Something New . . . , 54 LA. L.
REV. 1173, 1192–93 (1994).
82 See Bray, supra note 22, at 578–80.
83 Paul B. Miller, Equity as Supplemental Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
LAW OF EQUITY 92, 93 (Dennis Klimchuk, Irit Samet & Henry E. Smith eds., 2020); Smith,
Equity as Meta-Law, supra note 3 (manuscript at 78).
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An important and emblematic example of the confusion of equity in
intellectual property grows out of the law of misappropriation.  The United
States Supreme Court’s decision in International News Service v. Associated
Press84 is applauded or (more often) deplored as creating a fountainhead of
intellectual property rights, in hot news or more widely in time-sensitive
information.85  As I have argued elsewhere, this interpretation overlooks the
Court’s repeated insistence that the case was one of equity.86  Equity can
have a limited role in protecting commercial custom within a defined group
(here competitors), reflected in quasi-property not being in rem.87
A similar systematic problem of law versus equity arises in trademark and
unfair competition.  These areas of law have a similar origin to misappropria-
tion in equitable enforcement of commercial morality.  Here the process of
propertization went further, to much controversy.88  Nevertheless, because
the activity here involves deception and even opportunism, it is inherently
difficult to capture bad behavior using first-order law only.  Not surprisingly,
this has led to a proliferation of standards and to reliance on unfair competi-
tion as a backup source of liability.89  Understandably, and especially so after
the merger of law and equity, thoughtful commentators have asked why we
don’t have one single overarching body of law to deal with trademarks and
calibrate it ex ante (specifying pockets of nonliability if those seem to make
sense).  Or if equity is in the picture, it is sometimes suggested to bring back
equity in the sense of discretion.  I propose that unfair competition has a role
to play in trademarks if and only if it can serve as a (limited) meta-law backup
to trademark law itself (which, being more specialized and working in tan-
dem with equity, could perhaps then be simpler and narrower).  The need
for meta-law is even greater if trademark is a more use-based and contextual-
ized property right than is commonly thought.90
Equity polices interdependent behavior in other ways relevant to intel-
lectual property.  To the extent that unfair surprise can happen with stan-
84 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
85 Shyamkrishna Balganesh, “Hot News”: The Enduring Myth of Property in News, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 419, 430 (2011).
86 Smith, Equity as Meta-Law, supra note 3 (manuscript at 35–36).
87 Id.  The opinion in INS v. AP does not discuss custom in any detail but it can be
interpreted along these lines. See, e.g., Balganesh, supra note 85, at 448–51; Richard A.
Epstein, International News Service v. Associated Press: Custom and Law as Sources of Property
Rights in News, 78 VA. L. REV. 85, 116–17 (1992). But see Jennifer E. Rothman, The Question-
able Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899 (2007).
88 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108
YALE L.J. 1687, 1693–94 (1999); see also Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of
Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1873–74 (2007).
89 See Robert G. Bone, Rights and Remedies in Trademark Law: The Curious Distinction
Between Trademark Infringement and Unfair Competition, 98 TEX. L. REV. 1187 (2020); Mark P.
McKenna, Property and Equity in Trademark Law, 23 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 117, 134
(2019).
90 Adam Mossoff, Trademark as a Property Right, 107 KY. L.J. 1, 4–6 (2018).
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dard-essential patents, estoppel can be a solution.91  If a patentee is not
forthcoming about a patent and allows standard setters to adopt a standard
the patent covers, estoppel can apply to prevent enforcement of the right in
that context.  The characteristic of equity is that it will look at behavior on
both sides and in relation to each other.
CONCLUSION
Intellectual property remedies are—or should be—multidimensional.
The law once relied heavily on equity to go to a second order, as meta-law, in
order to solve problems of great complexity and uncertainty.  Such problems
are endemic to intellectual property, and remedies for intellectual property
suffer from the tendency for equity to be flattened out of the law.  It is time
to resurrect the pieces of equity that remain and reassemble them into a
more robust meta-law.
91 Smith, supra note 68, at 1085–86.
